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RFM: An interview with John Sherman Cooper, August 28, 1980 
in his office in the Covington and Burling Law Office, 
888 Sixteenth Street, Northwest, Washington, DoC. 20006. 
The interview is conducted by Robert Franklin Maddox, 
Director of the Oral History of Appalachia Project, 
Marshall University. The interview was conducted as 
part of the background research for an art-, for a chapter 
in a book dealing with John Sherman Cooper's opposition to 
the Vietnam Waro The interview deals primarily with the 
question of Vietnam and Cooper's positions in the United 
States Senate on Vietnam. 
This has got about forty- five minutes on that side. 
Now what in your background and experience, uh, caused 
you to oppose the American intervention in Southeast Asia? 
JSC: Well, to be honest I did not oppose it at first, although 
I doubted its wisdom. In one of the articles from the 
Congressional Record, which I'll give you today, from a 
debate on the Senate floor, I outlined in general the 
history of the war as I had studied it. It won't take 
long. I have always thought that the French were primarily 
responsible for the Vietnam war. The Japanese humiliated 
the French in World War II, who controlled Vietnam, North 
and South, Laos, and drove them out. After the close of 
r 
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World War II, there was some talk the United States and 
Great Britain propose a trust territory. But the French 
with all of that great pride i-RFM: (Laughs) ./ immediately, 
without consultation with Great Britain or the United States, 
sent the puppet Emperor Bao Dai back to North Vietnamo Ho 
Chi Minh, the popular leader, did not wish to oppose the 
Frenc~ at that time. But later the French fired upon a 
meeting of a North Vietnamese group under Ho Chi Minh in 
Hanoi and the war between the French and the Vietna~ese 
began. Vietnam then was united as a whole, North and South 
Vietnam, and at the battle of Dien, Dien Phu or Bien Dien 
Phu, I don't always (laughs) get the correct name, the 
French forces were disastrously defeated and had to evacuate 
Vietnam. At that time President Eisenhower was President. 
There were some who thought that the United States should 
intervene by land forces or by air. President Eisenhower 
refused to do so. He sent one of his trusted military 
aavisors, I believe General Ridgeway, who had served under 
him in Europe and who reported ba~k, as Eisenhower believed, 
that there was no possible chance to win in guerrilla 
warfare. At least it wasn't important to our securityo 
Eisenhower refused to send in troops, and this should 
always be remembered. It will be recalled, negotiations 
went on and in the Geneva Accords it was agreed that North 
r 
f 
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Vietnam and South Vietnam would be divided on the thirty-
eighth parallel, that there would be a neutral zone, three 
to five miles wide, on which troops would not be stationed. 
But it was agreed, as the French and British insisted, that 
there would be elections to eventually unite Vietnam. Mr. 
John Foster Dulles was our Secretary of State. He refused 
to sign the Accords, but said that he supported them in 
substance, on the condition there would be free elections. 
RFM: Do you think President Eisenhower, uh, did this because he 
was a military man and really understood the implications 
of an American intervention? 
JSC: What? 
RFM: Do you think that President Eisenhower was able to, uh, 
you know, kind of prevent an A~erican intervention because 
he, he did have a military background L JSC: Absolutely._/ 
and was not as impressed with the military staff? 
JSC: Yes, he knew that. I knew him well when he became President_ 
Before, I knew him well when he was Commander of NATO Forces 
and had talked to him in 1951 in Paris. He had seen the 
awful World War II. You will remember he refused to send 
troops when Great Britain, France and Israel tried to take 
over the Suez Canal from Egypt. They didn't consult him 
but he said he was strongly opposed to American participation. 
I don't want to say condemn, he wasn't that kind of man, but 
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he said they were wrongo He wouldn't send troops. He 
did send troops into Lebanon once. When there was a threat 
to Lebanon, then a very free and neutral country. He sent 
some troops there and the threat disappeared. He did leave 
six hundred military personnel in South Vietnam as civilian 
and military advisors to help ambassadors to the South 
Vietnam Government and the South Vietnamese Army. It wasn't 
long until war broke out between North and South Vietnam. 
I think one must remember in all fairness that the aggressors 
came from the North, from North Vietnam. With one exception, 
the later bombing of North Vietnam and Haiphong harbor under 
President Johnson and some minor retaliatory raids7 all the 
aggression, the attacking troops, the North Vietnamese moving 
into South Vietnam either directly through the demilitarized 
zone or down through Laos and Cambodia on what was called 
the Ho Chi Minh Trail. In retrospect, I believe that was 
aggression by North Vietnam. Ho Chi Minh always had 
determined that he was going to take over South Vietnam. 
I don't know what he thought about Cru~bodia, but the North 
Vietnamese have now taken over Cambodia and Laos and 
reestablished the old Siamese Empire as a Communist state. 
I will only say this about my feeling at the time of 
the French return to Vietnam in 1954. The British Broadcasting 
Company, BBC, asked Senator Mansfield of Montana, a D·emocrat, 
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and me to appear on a program about Vietnam. At the time 
of the defeat of the, the French in 1954. I think they 
probably thought because we were of different parties we'd 
take (laughs) opposite stances. But both of us said under 
no circumstances should the United States ever intervene 
in South Vietnam, nor in North Vietnam. (Laughs) I think 
it ruined their program but that's what we said in 1954. 
RFM: Now what, why did you believe that in 1954? 
JSC: Well I was pretty old, 53 years, but I went through World 
War II. I spent almost two years in the Third Army under 
General Patton. I wasn't in the first line troops but I 
was a messenger, taking messages up to different divisions 
and different units in combato I saw an awful lot and I 
saw what happened. Cities destroyed, people killed. I saw 
dead men. I saw the newly buried graves. I saw prisoners 
penned into stockades. I saw the concentration camp, the 
first one captured by the Americans in East Germany at 
Buchenwald. I happened to be taking a message to US troops 
occupying Buchenwald the day of its capture L RFM: Is that 
right?_/. I was there one half an hour L RFM: Oh my God._/ 
after it was taken by the American soldiers. The Hitler SS 
ran off and there really wasn't any fight. But before they 
left they killed forty or fifty of those poor immates who 
were lying around. Twenty thousand starved immates were 
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lying on shelves in barracks ana nearby were three crema-
toriums where they burned the dead bodies. I saw the violence 
of war, L RFM: Okay._/ I came to believe that war solves 
nothing, unless we actually have to protect our country 
and people's security. Ana it didn't seem to me, and it 
doesn't now, that Vietnam involved our security. 
RFM: Course that, that's actually the traditional, that's the 
traditional American positiono 
JSC: Yes. 
RFM: Up into, uh, the twentieth century. 
JSC: Yes. 
RFM: Is, is, uh, exactly the way you expressed it for defense, 
period. Home ana hearth ana, ana that kind of thing. 
JSC: You will remember that George Kennan, a famous scholar, a 
State Department expert on Russia, Ambassador to Russia, 
had first proposed what was called the Containment Theory, 
to hold Russia in, to prevent then aggression. John Foster 
Dulles accepted the theory that we should protect, if possible, 
all free countries where there was aggression against them. 
President Truman accepted the position in Koreao He sent 
US troops in without Congressional authority when Korea 
was attacked~ Dulles and Eisenhower were very close. I'm 
sure that Dulles influenced Eisenhower on general principles 
of foreign policy but he couldn't budge him on military action. 
.. 
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RFM: Okay. Now under President Kennedy, L JSC: Yes._/ we see 
a, you know, a step up in activity in 1961 and particularly 
in 1962 and you opposed, uh, uh, any potential sending of 
troops into Southeast Asia L JSC: Yes._/ in 1962. For 
the same reasons of 1954 would you say,/ JSC: Yes._/ or 
was the situation a little different? 
JSC: It is hardly known and never hardly mentioned but, and I 
say this in deep respect for President Kennedy. In the 
short time he lived we know what he did to protect our 
security when the Soviets were bringing nuclear weapons 
into Cuba. It took great courage to do that. I happened 
to be in Washingtono It was in the fall. We were all out 
campaigning when we were asked to report, at least Senator 
Morton and myself, either to Atlanta or Washington. Well, 
I came to Washington. I went to the State Department, got 
some briefing, then I went over to the White House. President 
Kennedy, with whom I had served for six years, heard I was in 
the White House and asked me to come up to private quarters 
where he was sitting in his rocking chair. He told me what 
he'd done, that our ships were moving out and they were going 
to stop the blockade. They were going to blockade the 
Russians and ·he said they will turn backo He said, "I know 
it's a critical time but thank God, they will turn back," 
L RFM: Yeah._/. But he did send, I can't give you the exact 
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number, someplace between twelve an::! fifteen thousand troops 
to South Vietnam to assist Vietnam, Vietnamese forces. They 
were not supposed to enter into active combat. I know all 
this because I talked to the group of Senators who went to 
Vietnam to find out the situation regarding our troops. They 
stated our planes and forces were asked to ferry South 
Vietnamese troops up to the thirty-eighth parallel which 
had been breached by the North Vietnam and had carried out 
a terrible massacre at the city of Hue in North Vietnam. 
But of course our planes were fired on and our men had to 
fire back to protect themselves and we were in the war. It 
illustrated the danger of sending troops abroad when we are 
not in war. 
I have the view that President Kennedy would never have 
engaged in the war we finally found ourself in. I believe 
that he would have found a way to withdraw our troops with 
honor through acceptance of the Geneva Accords before we 
had so many killed and got in so deeply. You may ask me 
why I say that. I have no substantial facts for it except 
my own knowledge of President Kennedy. We served together 
for several years on the Committee on Labor. I think because 
we were so different in ages and I was a Republican and he 
was a Democrat he would talk to me when he might not talk 
to, to others. He also sent me on a mission once, which 
John Sherman Cooper 9 
I'll have to write about sometime, it was to Moscow before 
he was inaugurated, to talk to the Russian leaders, which 
showed he had some trust in me. But sadly, when he was 
assassinated in 1964 I would say then that's when the 
beginning of the real American involvement opened up in Vietnam. 
RFM: Okay, now since you, uh, we're moving from Kennedy into 
Johnson L JSC : Um, mmm._/ and you've indicated that you 
didn't think that Kennedy would have expanded the war in 
quite that way. Uh, and then we find Lyndon Johnson, uh, who, 
you know, obviously, uh, expanded American involvement there 
L JSC : Yes._/. Uh, again do you think it was because, as in 
the case of Eisenhower, Eisenhower wasn't as impressed with 
the military? Uh, do you think Kennedy was not as impressed 
with some of his advisors in the military as was Lyndon Johnson? 
JSC: Well, about that, I think they were of different natures . I 
knew both of them, served in the Senate with then. I talked 
to Kennedy a great deal because of our Committee on Laboro I 
think he confided in me because he knew I wasn't talking to 
anybody about what he said. Also,/ RFM: Yeah._/ you know, 
L RFM: Sure._/ we had no conflicting a:nbitions, I wasn't 
running for President L RFM: Yeah, sure._/. Then President 
Johnson, in 1964 President Johnson presented to the Senate 
the Tonkin Gulf Revolution/ RFM: Okay._/. Now I must say 
right here that (papers shuffling) I was one that voted for it. 
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There were two votes against it, Senator Gruening, of Alaska 
and Senator Morse of Oregon . I have to confess that I knew 
what I was doing. The resolution had two parts. The first 
was constitutional o It gave to the President the authority 
to protect our troops, an authority which he already possessed. 
Second, it gave him the authority to take such measures as he 
thought necessary to carry out the provisions of the SEATO 
Treaty countries to the South, Eastern Asia Treaty, which 
included as sponsors Great Britain, Pakistan, Australia, 
New Zealand, France, and others. The second provision was 
designed to take measures to defend the protocol states, 
Vietnam, Cambodia and Laos according to our constitutional 
process . But the resolution did not define constitutional 
process L RFM : Yeah._/. I had studied all the treaties 
the US entered into since World War II . They involved forty-
two countries, not that many treaties because some of them 
were multi-lateral, with a number of parties, and some bi-
lateral like Japan and the United States. But the same 
wording appeared in all, ''according to the parties constitutional 
processeso" The Foreign Relations Committee, in every case, 
refused to interpret the langua~e as requiring approval by 
the full Congress to commit US forcesa I knew that the Tonkin 
Gulf Resolution would give the President the power if he 
wanted it. On the day the amendment came up in the Senate, 
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I entered into what they call a colluquy, L RFM: Yeah._/ 
a fancy word, a question and answer period, with Senator 
Fulbright. who was managing the bill. I wasn't on the Foreign 
Relations Committee at that time. I asked his view of the 
authority given to the President. I asked him if we were 
not giying the President the authority to send troops and to 
enter into war in protection of these countries if he so 
decided. Senator Fulbright said, "yes." Later, and I don't 
say this in criticism, he said he'd been fooled by Johnson 
during the hearings who had not told all the circumstances 
about the attack on our shipso I don't know what went on in 
the hearings. I would say that Secretary Rusk of State was 
one of the most honest men I ever knew. The Tonkin Gulf 
Resolution grew out of the firing on an American vessel off 
the coast of North Vietnam L RFM: Yeah, the USS Maddox._/o 
I believe it was fired on, I have no doubt about it. The 
question is, would retaliation have been enough - fired back 
at it and attack against North Vietna~ shore buttresses? The 
hearings required more investigation before asking for the 
broad Tonkin Gulf Resolution. I have to say I knew what I 
was doing when I voted. It appears in the Congressional 
Record and when President Johnson wrote his memoires he 
included my question and answer debate with Senator Fulbright 
in his book. He did that I'm sure because he got awful angry 
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with Senator Fulbright L RFM: (Laughs.)_/. He wanted to 
show that Senator Fulbright agreed with me, that we were 
giving him this authority if he decided to use it. But I, 
like the rest, had the general feeling that I didn't believe 
really that he would engage the US in the war that followed. 
Later, I recall that President Johnson came up to the Capitol 
one day and called a number, curiously enough~ not into Mike 
Mansfield's office, who was then the Democratic Leader of the 
Senate, who had succeeded Johnson as the leader (laughs). 
But he asked us to meet in Senator Dirkson's office L RFM: Is 
that right?_/ who, who was the Republican leader. I remember 
there were about thirty there. People from the Foreign 
Relations Committee, people from the Armed Services Committee 
and, and others. He told us he was going to send thirty- five 
thousand troops to Vietnam. That was the largest number at 
that time and it was a shock. I can remember Senator Saltonstall, 
who was a very quiet man who usually went along with any 
administration. A very honorable man from Massa::husettes, 
who was the ranking Republican on the Armed Services Committee. 
He spoke up vigorously and said, "I think it's wrong, Lyndon." 
That's the first time I think I had heard him L RFM: Is that 
right?_/ oppo$e a President. Oh, but Johnson said, "We' 11 just 
clean it up." Well you know what followed. More and more 
raids from the North into South Vietnam. They came in 
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Laos aha Cambodia through the demilitarized zone, agreed on 
in the Geneva Accords and they were all through the northern 
parto They got into the southern part, south of what's now 
called Ho Chi Minh City but was then Saigon, the capitol of 
South Vietnam. Then in 1965 we began to bomb North Vietnam 
about '66. I began to speak against the bombing of North 
Vietnam on the premise that cessation of bombing, it might 
bring about the possibility of negotiations. I remember 
President Johnson called me down to his office several times. 
He was always courteous but he would say we have stopped 
bombing several times. I told him, "yes, but you've done it 
on their holidays, religious holidays, for a few days, and 
as soon as their religious holidays are over you've started 
again." "My judgement is they don't consider you've stopped 
at all L RFM: (Laughs o) /." I told him, I'm not saying 
forever, but for a month or two and it's not doing any damage. 
You haven't bombed anything up there that would really damage 
North Vietnamo Such as their chief sources of water supply 
which produce very good. If they were bombed it would flood 
one of their great rivers and sources of supplieso But always 
underneath there was the question whether China or Russia 
would intervene. They were both in competition supplying 
North Korea and I think, as I spoke in 1966, one would have 
intervened. I don't know what else the President would have 
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done unless he'd invaded North Korea, and without China or 
Russia intervening, he might have very well invaded North 
Korea. If he'd had done that in the flat part of the war, 
he probably would have to defeat North Vietnam, but again 
with Congressional authorization. But when the casuality 
list came in the real furor in our country begun and opposition 
began to develop throughout the United States. 
RFM: Do you think, uh, General Westmoreland's policy of using 
search and destroy missions, war of attrition L JSC: Huh?_/. 
Do you think General Westmoreland's actions in using the 
search and destroy missions, do you think this was the 
proper kind of activity? 
JSC: Well I'm not a military expert, I visited with Vietnam twice. 
curiously enough, it was in '65 and '66. I went to his 
headquarters. I knew him as he formerly was in command of 
Fort Campbell in Kentucky, and as a fine military field 
commander. It's on the line between Kentucky and Tennessee. 
They're still fighting about the name of the post office 
L RFM: (Laughs.)_/o But I visited and of course I, in those 
briefings him and his staff (break in conversation, noise in 
background). 
RFM: Here, let me get you one. 
JSC: The books say, I was looking for the cigarettes. 
RFM: There you go. Be in your coat over here? 
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JSC: Yes. Oh, they would say that we are gradually winning by 
our Vietnamesation program in the villages where they had 
a security force there and by our search and destroy program 
sending out patrols, and we just need more men. That was in 
1 65. By chance I went back in 1 66, and I went with Dean 
Rusk, he asked me to go and course I didn't sit in on the 
conferences with the leader. They had a different leader 
first time I was out there (coughs). I can't remember his 
name, the second time was Ky, (spells) K-Y, and I remember 
we all had dinner one night up in his private place. He had 
a little place in the airport: he had his own helicopter in 
his garden and guards everywhere. Then again General Westmoreland 
was very confident they would eventually win but always there 
was the request to send more troop, more troops. The second 
time I was in Saigon I noticed one official from the State 
Department who was pretty quiet when the rest talked more 
confidently and I asked him if he would see me later. I asked 
him if he would have a talk with meo We talked for about an 
hour and he told me of course he supported policies, support 
by the government, our ambassador, State Department, the 
commander's policy. But he said, "I can see no light at the 
end of the tunnel. I don't think we're going to get out of it." 
RFM: And this, you were saying this in '65 and '66? 
JSC: '66 - not without negotiations or an even greater war. 
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RFM: 1 66, okay. 
JSC: One thing our leaders in South Vietnam complained about and 
I think correctly, the two times I was there, was that the 
US media was very unfair painting the worst picture of US 
military actions. They had played up in contrast the killing 
of Vietnamese civilians by the American captain at ••• 
RFM: My Lai. 
JSC: What? 
RFM: At My Lai. 
JSC: Yes, yea. Our forces spoke of Hue in the North of South 
Vietnam. Vietnamese had overrun and murdered South Vietnamese 
citizens. The A.merican military leaders said, and I think 
truthfully that the North Vietnamese had invaded Hue and 
slaughtered people by the hundreds, private citizens. They 
told me, General Westmoreland did, and our civilian officials 
had without success begged the American photographers and 
television people and media to go there and record the 
slaughter, as they did about My Lai later. They felt that the 
American media did not report fairly on even what limited 
successes they had. 
RFM: Okay, I tell you, let 1 s stop a second and let me flip this 
tape. 
JSC: Allright. 
RFM: Okay, now, uh, in 1966 you began to, uh, speak out more and 
r 
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more that Congress should take a more active role 
L JSC: Yes._/ in a, t_JSC: I was on the Foreign Relations 
Committee._/. You began to feel, I think, from looking at 
some of the things you said, that the President was exceeding 
his authority. So we came into a constitutional question 
and a constitutional crisis and even though at that point 
you seem to feel that Congress should focus its attention 
on the escalation of the war and not policy itself. Now 
why did you take the position that it should be escalation 
cnd not policy? 
JSC: What? 
RFM: Escalation of the war and not the policy which the Johnson 
Administration was, was evolving in Vietnam. 
JSC: Well it was policy. I actually became a member of the 
Foreign Relations Committee. Let's see, I served six years 
on it, beginning in 1966. In 1967 I studied the authority 
of the President and Congressional war making power. Senator 
Fulbright and others began to talk about the relative powers 
of the Executive and the Congress toward committing troops 
abroad without the consent of the Congresso Senator Fulbright 
introduced a resolution which he called the Commitments 
Resolution and which appears in the text of this speech that 
I will give to you. I did not think his wording of the 
Resolution was precise enough although he's a finely educated 
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man L RFM: Yeah._/ and had been on the Foreign Relations 
Committee for many years and a fine chairman. But I, I 
thought it was redundant. It ended up in a circle. I 
offered a substitute which was defeated by the committee 
and his version was reported by the Committee to the Senate. 
When it got on the floor a good many objections were raised 
along the lines I had suggested. He came over to me and 
asked me if he could offer my version as a substitute for 
his, the one which was before the Senate. I said of course. 
So he then presented mine and it was accepted by the Senate 
and it became the Fulbright Resolution, as amended by Senator 
Coopero Its wording and substance was that the President 
had no authority to engage the United States in war or to 
send troops into a situation which might involve us in war 
without the consent of the Congress. Practically everybody 
voted for it. I think many of the people on the Armed Services 
Committee voted for it. Senator Stennis, its Chairman, who's 
a wonderful man, and who always supported the President in 
military matters, joined in voting for it. And so while it 
is the initiative of Senator Fulbright, the actual wording 
is mine. Well then in '69 the Armed Services Committee 
voted out a bill authorizing aid in different fashions to 
Thailand, Laos as well as Vietnamo The language was the 
same. It didn't say troops, it did mention material, 
r 
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equipment, and all that, but it offered aid and it was not 
defined exactly. Remembering the Fulbright-Cooper Commitments 
Resolution, I questioned Senator Stennis, who had charge of 
the bill, if this would mean we could give, put forces, 
American forces in Laos or Thailand. Curiously, we already 
had forces there L RFM: (Laughs.)_/ so I wasn't really, 
wasn't questioning that so mucho There were 36,000 or 40,000 
American troops in Thailand then at air bases and Sera.tor 
Stennis was very fairo He said he, he was not intending to 
authorize troops, only in his view, supplies. But he 
recognized that it was a question which had to be considered. 
It was debated one evening and several Senators attacked me r 
pretty vigorously. Senator Tower of Texas thought I was 
endangering American troops in South Vietnam if my amendment 
were adopted. I said then you speak to the Department of 
Defense about it and we will bring it up another day. It 
was brought up another day and the Senate accepted my amendment 
or, or moved it in such a way that it would, it would not 
allow troops to be used in Laoso The US already had troops 
in Thailand. Cambodia wasn't much considered at the time 
because it was considered to be a neutral country. But the 
truth of the matter is we were actually, which we found out 
later, in Cambodiao Senator Fulbright sent two messengers 
to Laos and Cambodia. Our Ambassador to Laos was a practical 
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general there in charge of our troops. There was some 
authority for this position because the Ho Chi Minh Trail 
ran through Laos and Cambodia and of course we had a right 
to attack the trail. The law in war is that you have the 
right to attack to protect your troops. But the US was 
extending our air forces through other areas of Laos. 
RFM: Okay. One thing I want to get back a little bit, uh, did 
you at some point come to the conclusion that despite all 
the American aid that the South Vietnamese were unable to 
defend themselves or come up with a stable form of government, 
did you L JSC: Yes._/ ultimately come to that conclusion? 
JSC: That always changes. I, I said I remember in '65 they had 
a man in charge who was President. There were changes, he 
had been pushed out and with the assent of the US. The next 
President was Ky, to whom I have referred. He was an air 
force marshall, very vain and wanted to be the head man, 
even above the American Commander. He didn't last long. At 
the dinner I attended at Ky's, we ate outdoorso There was 
a man named Thieu there, (spells) T-H-I-E-U, and everybody 
said he's the best man in the cabinet, both US and TW 
personnel. He later became President and he held the office 
till the end of the war, and was condemned as ineffective by 
opponents of the war. It was the North Vietnamese fighting 
a hard war to win (it is said the people from the north are 
r 
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stronger and harder fighters than people from the south.). 
I wouldn't say that's true, when we think of our Civil War 
L RFM: (Laughs.) /. But it was trueo South Vietnam couldn't 
have survived without American help. The next matter of 
Senate interest ca~e up by way of rumor or leak. There 
always are leaks, f_ RFM: Yeah._/ sometimes the press finds 
them out. Somebody leaks and sometimes the government leaks. 
I don't think the government leaked in this case, but there 
were rumors that United States troops with the South Vietnamese 
were going to invade Cambodia. They were to attack (coughs) 
a large communication center in Cambodia and ammunition dumps 
used by the North Vietnamese. But curiously enough, we called 
Secretary of State Rogers before the committee, (that was 
before Mr. Kissinger took over). Secretary Rogers is a very 
honest man and he just said flatly, "I cannot respond to you." 
Considering what has passed since then I can't tell you 
whether he knew or didn't know (laughter). Perhaps the 
National Security Council under President Nixon's Administration 
and President Ford's and now President Carter, had taken over 
the authority of the Secretary of State. 
RFM: The whole thing, right? 
JSC: Secretary Rogers was a very honest man, straight man, and as 
you know, he resigned as Secretary after a while. I don't 
know whether he knew or not about the projected invasion of 
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Cambodia. But if he did know he, he was not going to tell 
us. Well within a day or two, I proposed to Senator Aiken 
of Vermont, a wise man, and to Senator Mansfield, Democratic 
Leader, we offer an amendment prohibiting in a constitutional 
way the use of any funds to send American troops into Cambodia. 
/ 
It is a power of the Congress under the constitution . Senator 
Frank Church joined me in its introduction. He was on the 
Foreign Relations Committee, as were Mansfield and Aikeno 
Senators Mansfield and Aiken were very influential men in 
-the Senate. Everyone, the press, always call the amendment the 
Cooper- Church Amendment, but Senators Mansfield and Aiken were 
also on it and their influence was very helpfulo Again, 
curiously, the day we were going to introduce our amendment 
(laughs) the, the President sent troops into Cambodia, 
L RFM: (Laughs.)_/ but we introduced our amendment any way. 
It was followed by a debate which lasted two or three months. 
The President had a ~eeting at the White House with us and 
other members of the Congress, both opposing and supporting 
the US invasion. He agreed that he would withdraw troops on 
a date certain. As I recall it was June the first or July 
first, about sixty days in the future. The debate continued 
all that time. We wanted our amendment passed not only to 
assure that they withdraw but to prevent a future invasion 
and also to establish the principle that the President could 
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not expand the war into another country without the authority 
of the Congress. 
RFM: Now didn't Congress also bout the same time repeal the Gulf 
of Tonkin interest? 
JSC: Yes, they repealed it. I do not think it helped as a matter 
of fact, as our troops were already in Cambodia and under the 
President's power of protection. Finally after the date the 
President had set (Senator Cooper's secretary enters the room). 
Thank you L Secretary: Sure._/. O~r amendment passed. But 
in the Senate-House conference it was reduced. Ours prohibited 
the use of any American forces, ground, air, whatever. In 
conference the House insisted that it could only cover ground 
troops and the Senate accepted the compromise as . the best we 
could do. The amendment was passed and the President signed 
it, and it was the first legislation in history passed 
inhibiting the war powers of the President. And the amendment 
was also extended to Laos. But in both cases, as reduced by 
the House, it only referred to ground troops. We found out 
later that US air forces were used in both Cambodia.and Laos. 
RFM: How do you react to the critics, uh, of that amendment who 
say that this was an encroachment on Presidential authority, 
course you're · really in a gray area L JSC: Yes._/ to a certain 
degree. But how do you react to critics, uh, you know? 
JSC: Well I have had many critics on that point. We had lots of 
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youngsters then - students who were coming L RFM: Yeah._/ 
from all over the country to Washington, corning into our 
office to talk. I left the door open. I talked to all of 
them, everybody I saw. I also got thousands of letters, 
and I think I answered a great many of them. But they came, 
such a volume, I don't believe a lot of them were ever answered, 
thousands from the entire country. I did get up a printed 
letter expressing my position and that of my colleagues, which 
I sent to those who were for or against the amendment, explaining. 
The same letter went to all. Those against it were very vicious 
at times, mostly very critical, some viciouso Some without 
signing their name would call me obscene names (laughter). 
Some signed their name too. But I just sent them the same 
letter, of course the anonomous I couldn't answer any way. 
But I was convinced we had adopted the right course, that it 
was the constitutional authority of the Congress to provide 
funds for the war or to cut the funds off if it chose to do 
so, that was the proper course. Now there were a~endments 
offered by Senator Hatfield just to set a date when we should 
withdraw from all of Vietna~. I voted against that and I was 
criticised very strongly, but I felt that the Congress only 
constituted authority through the power of the purse. But 
we didn't have the authority to tell the President, withdraw 
our troops on a certain day . where they might be in mutual danger. 
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That was going too far and these amendments lost by large 
votes. Finally whenfue President announced, I think it was 
in 1972 that he was going to withdraw the troops on a day 
certain, then I did introduce an amendment that they should 
be withdrawn on that day that he had fixed. 
RFM: Do you think the precedent which, L JSC: But it was never 
voted on./ do you think the precedent which was set by the 
Cooper-Church Amendment will, uh, in effect prevent some 
kind of way, you know, that they did in Vietnam? 
JSC: Oh, that depends on the circumstances. Later Senator Javits 
and Senator Eagleton and curiously enough Senator Stennis 
introduced what they call the War Power Bill L RFM: Yeah._/. 
I voted for it but I wrote an individual view saying I voted 
for it because I thought it was a necessary guideline and 
proper in its objectives. but I thought it was unconstitutional. 
For this reason. It provides that in the event of an attack 
on the US, its forces or people, if fue circumstances weren't 
such which affected our immediate security, the President had 
to convene the Congress. If, if there were circumstances such 
as we were being attacked, of course, he'd have the constitional 
right on his own initiative to defend the country, troops, and 
people. The bill stated that within thirty days the Congress 
should meet and then decide whether or not our troops would 
be withdrawn, and the war stopped. Well my thought was if 
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the same circumstances prevailed sixty days later that had 
prevailed when he had the constitutional right to commit 
our troops, that constitutional right continued to protect our 
security and forces and it was doubtful whether Congress could 
order him to withdraw troops unless the Congress cut off fundso 
RFM: Okay. Now, President Nixon, uh, of course ran in 1968, uh, 
implying that he would end the war. 
JSC: Yes. 
RFM: Now do you think that he was honestly committed to that course 
of action, uh, which ultimately became the Vietnamesation 
policy, uh, or do you think this was political rhetoric or 
do you think he gave us a little more of the same or, uh, • 
JSC: Well I think that he was co:nrnitted, but after he entered office, 
400,000 US troops were in Vietnam that was enough. I knew him 
since he came to Congress. He was in the House and I was in 
the Senate and I was out of the Senate at times, defeated 
several times. I wasn't in the Senate when he was there, I 
was out then 0 But I knew him better when he was Vice-President. 
The Vice-Presidents didn't have all the fancy offices they 
have now~ he just had an office over in the Senate Office 
Building, bout three doors from mine. Curiously enough Jack 
Kennedy was right across the hall from him. 
RFM: Is that right, huho 
JSC: I'd invite him over to my office and sometimes he'd call me 
John Shennan Cooper 27 
in ana we'a talk. He was always very nice to meo He never 
got angry ana he always, although he didn't like my position. 
But he once told me, "John, you oppose on several things that 
are important to me but you never hit me personally." And I 
didn't and so, ana he callea me down to the White House once 
in a while ana he'd talk to me about some things. Whan 
Eisenhower was President and the question was whether we shoula 
send troops to Vietnam when the French were defeated, there 
was talk around that Nixon favored sending at least air forces 
in, I don't know whether that's true or not. But he was always 
a strong man for protecting the security of the United States 
ana for that I applaude him, I believe we should maintain 
defenses and sufficient forces and power at least to assure 
our security ana to let the Soviets know they just can't run 
over us. Their abiding doctrine is to conquer the world 
eventually - the Marxist-Leninist teaching. President Nixon 
was very anti - communist ana I think he had the iaea that 
perhaps, thought Vietnamesation or strengthening our forces 
he coula bring the North Vietna~ese to a position where they 
woula be willing to reach some agreement. And he placed two 
eminent men in Paris, Averell Harriman and the former Secretary 
Cyrus Vance L RFM: Yeah._/ to negotiate with the Vietnamese. 
Saw them several times in Paris. They tola me that the North 
Vietnamese talked alot about negotiations with unofficial US 
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visitors but, with them, there were no negotiations at all 
about quitting. We had US people go over there and talk to 
the North Vietnamese and the North Vietnamese would say, "Oh 
we're ready to negotiate any time." I remember several of 
those people who came back and just jumped all over me. 
They would say we've seen the North Vietnamese, they say 
they're ready to negotiate, settle all this. Well, and 
Harriman, Vance told me that their talks were just nothing, 
no willingness to negotiate. Finally, the war dragged out 
and a kind of agreement was reached under which the South 
Vietnamese weren't able to protect themselves. The North 
Vietnamese broke their agreement, just took over Vietnam and 
of course now you see what they've done in Cambodia, which 
is in a terrible situation. 
RFM: Yes, it's an awful situation, yeaho Do you think, uh, 
Nixon's Vietnamese, Vietnamesation policy moved fast or 
he did move to withdraw troops and, and so forth. 
JSC: He withdrew some troops, you knowo 
RFM: Yeah. But do you think that he was moving quickly enough 
for Senator Cooper? 
JSC: Oh, it's hard to say, I have said, looking back I, I think 
there never w·as any questions in the mind of Ho Chi Minh, 
North Vietnamese leader. After his death, his successor, 
particularly General Giap, (spells) G-I-A-P, who said from 
. . 
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the beginning that the North Vietnamese were communist 
revolutionaries, we speak out of the barrel of a rifle, 
and that they were going to take North Vietnam, Laos and 
Cambodia. Whether China or Russia would intervene, I think 
was always in the minds of Johnson and Nixon, and I don't 
see how they could have ever thought we could of won that war. 
RFM: I know in, in '72 if I remember correctly, you called for a 
pullout of American troops in four months. 
JSC: What? 
RFM: In 1972 you pulled, you called for a pullout of American 
troops in a, in a four month period. 
JSC: Yes, after, after Nixon announced he would L RFM: Yeah./ 
have them out by that time. But I put a section in my amendment 
which was very much criticized. I thought it was one which 
"¼Duld, which would probably come closer to ending the war. 
Every amendment which had been offered about a pullout 
particularly that offered by Senator McGovernon and Brook 
and Hatfield, just said pullout by a certain date, but 
prescribing that our prisoners had to be released before the 
US pulled out. Well I felt that they were not going to release 
our prisoners until there'd been an actual pullout on our part. 
That was one of the ways they held us up. So my amendment 
left it out. I just said we would withdraw in four months. 
I was attacked on the floor rightfully they said it was inhuman. 
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I said in response, ''do you think they're going to release 
our prisoners as long as we are there and continue fighting. 
Prisoners have always been released after a war and course 
after everything was settled prisoners were released." 
It is still claimed that 700 or more are unaccounted for. 
But that was in '72. I assume there will always be a number 
whose fate will not be known . 
RFM : Do you think there was every possibility or did you hear 
rumors that there might be tactical nuclear weapons used, 
uh, in Vietnam? Do you think there was ever any danger of that? 
JSC: Of what? 
RFM : Tactical nuclear weapons. 
JSC : No, I don't think so. For example, if we'd actually started 
a pullout and our troops were moving towards ports or air 
fields, would be large accumulations of jammed groups. They'd 
be in a very vulnerable position . The North Vietnamese could 
have brought their troops in force and firing on our groups 
which were withdrawingo Our troops would have been in a 
dangerous position. There might be in that case, the use of 
tactical nuclear weapons to protect the withdrawal of Americans. 
RFM: Okay, what about the use of chemical agents in Vietnam? 
JSC: Well they were used all up and down the Ho Chi Minh Trail 
to defoliate the trees so US planes could see the North Vietnam 
troops coming down the Ho Chi Minh Trailo I don't feel so bad 
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about that. Some people do but after all we were in the war, 
our troops were being attacked and I don't know that these 
chemicals were toxic on individuals. 
RFM: I think, I think its been proven out that they have been in 
some cases. 
JSC: Yes, we know these chemicals do affect h~~an beings. 
RFM: Okay, I'm going to stop the tape here for just a second. 
Now what, uh, this is giving you a chance to evaluate yourself. 
JSC: What? 
RFM: What, what mistakes do you think you made as a Senator in 
relationship to the question of Vietnam? 
JSC: The biggest mistake I ever made was on the Gulf of Tonkin 
Resolution. My vote didn't affect its passing one iota 
L RFM: Yeah._/. But I should have been a Senator against 
it, because I knew and said at the time, that we were giving 
President Johnson the power to take us into war. There were 
three or four others who spoke against it. On the day that 
it came up, the Senator from Wisconsin, Gaylord Nelson, who's 
still a m!llber of the Senate raised some questions directed to 
Senator Fulbright and even talk .ebout offering an amendment 
but did not do so. A Senator from Maryland who was later 
defeated afte~ serving one term, Daniel Brewster, actually 
tried to offer an amendment and he was persuaded not to do 
so. If I had voted against it, I think they would have voted 
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against ito I believe Senator Mansfield would have voted 
against ito I believe George Aiken would've voted against it. 
Church would have. So I think that's all the effect my, there 
might have been some others, but there wouldn't been, would 
not have been many. Johnson was a tremendous man on pressure. 
I used to see him in the Senate when he was leader take these 
Senators who were up and over in the corner and change their, 
their votes (laughs). He'd even come over on the Republican 
side a time. He never did talk to me to change my vote but 
he, I know two or three he did. But he, he would, I can 
remember an occasion when he thought there'd be ten or fifteen 
voting against his proposals and then I remember one particularly 
and then nearly all, he got hold of them. I could see him 
talking to them and ended up with only one Democrat opposing 
him. I let loyalty to our President and our troops in Vietnam 
influence my vote. Morse, although he was an able man and 
did a lot of good things, did not have much influence in the 
Senate because they considered him a kind of maverick. 
Gruening was a good man, an older man, and was right but did 
not carry great political influence. He was greatly respected. 
I always have believed that his great hero, not unexpected, 
was Franklin D. Roosevelto He wanted to do something great 
on the domestic side like Franklin D. Roosevelto That's the 
reason he had for his health poverty programs. That's the 
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reason he made the fight on civil rightso He believed in 
these domestic programs, but I think he wanted to win a 
war like Franklin Roosevelt. 
RFM: What do you consider to be your great success concerning, 
L JSC: Hum?_/ what do you consider to be your greatest 
success as far as the issue of Vietnam is concerned? 
JSC: Well, I was the first one that raised the question of its 
constituting, and particularly lack of authority, to extend 
the war into countries other than Vietnamo It didn't draw 
much attention at first, but it gradually did. I was the 
first one along with Senator Nelson who protested the bombing 
of North Vietnam because we thought its cessation might offer 
an opening for negotiations. We spoke against bombing in 1965 
and 1966. I was the first one who asserted that the Congress 
had the power through denying funds, to prevent and then stop 
the expansion of the war into Ca~bodia and Laos. Finally, 
that you can prevent a war if it is not necessary for our 
country's security. 
RFM : Okay. One other question and I haven't, you know, we haven't 
said anything really about the politics of Vietna~ and John 
Sherman Cooper, but what impact did this have on you in the 
State of Kentucky in a political sense, the stands you were 
taking? 
JSC: Well you see some might say that I took my positions because 
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I wasn't a candidate in 1 720 But I'd taken stands before, 
from 1954 to 1964, in favor of civil rights in 1960 and 1966. 
Yet, I got a larger majority than I ever had after voting for 
civil rights. I won in 1 56 to fill out Senator Barkley's 
four year term by about sixty-five thousand and in 1960 I 
won my first six year term by 199,000 and in 1966 after the 
1964 civil rights battle. Although I got 30,000 letters 
opposing me, I won by a larger majority of 217,000. I hope 
this doesn't sound egotistical, but I'm rather proud of it 
a~d use it to illustrate my Vietnam position wasn't political 
L RFM: (Laughs·) I'm sureo_/. I carried every district in 
the state, even the first district and all but five or six 
countieso It was the largest majority that anyone had ever 
received for a state office. I mean, elected by the stateo 
President Johnson carried the state by a larger plurality 
and Nixon carried larger in 1972. I had decided in 1966 I 
wouldn't run again because I knew if I lived I'd be 71 at the 
time, and I wasn't going home and ask the people to keep me 
in until I was 77. Although now I'm 79. I knew it took every 
bit of your mental and physical strength to do the job and 
I wasn't certain that I would have it. The people have been 
good to me. Republicans and Democrats and I just felt it 
wrong to go down there and say will you keep me in the Senate 
until I'm 77 years old. People have told me, "yes you could 
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have won." Even today they tell me that, even today they 
tell me we wish you were in the Senate. But of course that 
could just be complimentary. I'm out. I'm no threat to 
anybody and I get along fine with all the members of the 
Kentucky delegation and we always did. We worked together 
on issues for Kentucky and we never had any trouble ana even 
now I, I get along with all the Kentucky delegates. I'm 
called for help once in a while by different members of 
Congress. They call on me once in a while to testify before 
committees, or other matters. But I think I did right in 
retiring. I quit at the right time, in time for the younger 
people to come along for their chance. 
RFM: Okay sir. Do you have any, any other comments you'd like to 
make on Vietnam that we didn't cover? 
JSC: Well I ao think that our long effort to secure negotiations 
and close the war had effect. When some of our forces were 
marooned on an island off of Cambodia, President Fora sent 
forces for their rescue. Although he's criticized by some 
for the action he took. I do not criticize him. We lost 
some men but the rest of them got out. He did notify the 
Congress in advance of his action. In a late effort to 
rescue our hostages, President Carter didn't notify the Congress. 
He just said it was not an invasion of Iran, but a rescue 
attempt. You can argue it both ways, but I do not criticize 
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President Carter after it's doneo You have to be patriotic 
L RFM: Yeah, sureo_/. I have been criticizing the Vietnam 
situation where we backed into a war involving a half a 
million Americans and thousands of dead and wounded. As 
to the rescue effort in Iran, although now it appears very 
poorly organized, but I assume President Carter believed he 
had to make the effort. There is no reason why the President 
should not come to Congress except in those cases where we 
know our security is threatenedo An example would be action 
by the Soviets, the only ones with power to challenge us. 
Another example, China has got the power now. An attack on 
this continent, Canada or perhaps Mexico, and certainly, our 
western European NATO allies. If the Soviets attacked Europe, 
I would not say that the President does have the authority to 
move without the express authority of the Congress, and of 
course in the case of a nuclear disaster there would be no 
other course. In these cases the security of the United States 
and its people would be under threat, and I believe the 
President should act. 
RFM: Yeah, sure. 
JSC: I hope with all my heart that a Soviet-United States war 
will never oc~ur. Our people, as well as the Soviets, must 
realize a nuclear war would kill most of our population and 
most of the population of Russia and the European countries 
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as wello Even though the Russians with superior power might 
prolong it, the end result would be the same - the destruction 
of the world as we know it todayo When I was in East Germany, 
I found that even in those communist Warsaw Pact countries, 
they're very fearful of a nuclear waro They know they'd be 
the first to go down in total destructiona 
RFM: Be the first to go o 
JSC: Be wiped outo 
RFM: Yeah, yeah. 
JSC: That's the reason they shout Detente so mucho 
RFM : Well Senator, thank you so much for the interviewo It'll be 
very helpful, L JSC: What?_/ I said thank you so much for 
the interviewo 
JSC: Well, you've helped me and I appreciate your interesto I'll 
just be glad when the election is over and whoever is elected, 
we can resume efforts to build up a strong economy and to 
build up our defenses so that we have a stronger deterrent 
against war, and move toward a reduction of nuclear arms by 
treaty, both the United States and Russia o 
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